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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (AMENDMENT) 
BILL 
A Broader Framework for Interim Relief or Just a Tune-up? 
Singapore aspires to retain its place as a trusted arbitration 
hub for commercial parties all around the world. The 
recently proposed amendments to the International 
Arbitration Act seek to bring Singapore closer to meeting 
international standards in relation to the arbitration 
procedure. While the initiative should be applauded, those 
amendments relating to interim measures fall somewhat 
short of expectations of a new, broader framework of curial 
assistance in aid of arbitration. This article explores the 
uncertainties that could arise from the proposed 
amendments, either because of phrasing or of an omission to 
embrace the Model Law. It is hoped that Parliament will not 
wait too long to address these uncertainties which go against 
the grain of promoting Singapore as the ideal centre for 
arbitration. 
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I.  Introduction 
1  Commonwealth judges are no longer wary of commercial 
arbitrators nor do they lightly interfere with arbitrators’ powers and 
prerogatives. It is well settled that the courts will endeavour to do their 
best to facilitate and promote arbitration between commercial parties 
wher ev er possible.  This shift in judicial tact is not an entir ely rec ent 
phenomenon. As far back as 1977, Lord Denning MR observed thus in 
the English Court of Appeal decision of Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v 
Yuval Insurance Co Ltd:
1 
At one time the Courts used to be very jealous of arbitrations. They 
used to find all sorts of reasons for interfering with arbitrators and 
their awards. But the approach to arbitration has changed in modern 
days. The Courts welcome arbitrations in commercial disputes. They 
encourage references to arbitration to commercial men in the City of 
London. They do not lightly interfere with their awards. 
2  Last year, V K Rajah JA in Tjong Very Sumito v Antig Investments 
Pte Ltd expressed a similar sentiment, putting beyond any doubt that 
Singapore courts will support arbitration as a method of alternative 
dispute resolution, in the interests of expediency and party autonomy:
2 
There was a time when arbitration was viewed disdainfully as an 
inferior process of justice. Those days are now well behind us. An 
unequivocal judicial policy of facilitating and promoting arbitration has 
firmly taken root in Singapore. It is now openly acknowledged that 
arbitration, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution such as 
mediation, help to effectively unclog the arteries of judicial 
administration as well as offer parties realistic choices on how they want 
to resolve their disputes at a pace they are comfortable with. More 
fundamentally, the need to respect party autonomy (manifested by 
their contractual bargain) in deciding both the method of dispute 
resolution (and the procedural rules to be applied) as well as the 
substantive law to govern the contract, has been accepted as the 
cornerstone underlying judicial non-intervention in arbitration. In 
essence, a court ought to give effect to the parties’ contractual choice 
as to the manner of dispute resolution unless it offends the law. 
[emphasis added] 
3  Singapore courts, therefore, have a “conspicuously circumscribed 
role in relation to all arbitration proceedings”.
3 They have supportive 
and limited supervisory functions over arbitrations held in Singapore. 
These functions are those granted by statute alone – there are no 
inherent supervisory powers at common law that the courts could 
                                                                        
1  [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357 at 360. 
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otherwise exercise.
4 This position was achieved in respect of 
international arbitration in 1994 when Singapore implemented the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the 
1985 Model Law”) adopted by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) on 21  June 1985
5  via the 
International Arbitration Act 1994
6 (“the IAA”). Generally, the law 
governing the arbitration (the so-called lex arbitri) is considered to be 
the law of the country where the proceedings are held and the award 
rendered,  ie, the juridical seat of the arbitration.
7 And, “[t]he law 
governing the arbitration determines the relationship between the 
arbitral tribunal and national courts. It will, for instance, determine 
whether, and to what extent, judicial review of the award or court 
intervention during arbitral proceedings is authorized”.
8 The IAA 
governs international commercial arbitrations that rely on Singapore 
law as the lex arbitri.
9 
4  The 1985 Model Law, which applies in Singapore through the 
IAA,
10 excludes curial intervention unless expressly permitted. Article 5 
of the 1985 Model Law states that “[i]n matters governed by this Law, no 
court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law”. This 
provision requires all instances of court involvement in arbitration 
proceedings to be specifically stipulated, thus excluding any general or 
residual powers of our courts in relation to matters which are prescribed 
as governed by the 1985 Model Law. The underlying rationale here is to 
engender certainty for both arbitral parties and arbitrators alike as to 
the instances in which curial supervision or assistance is to be expected, 
such certainty being regarded as beneficial to international commercial 
arbitration.
11 
                                                                        
4  Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore (vol  2, “Arbitration”) (LexisNexis, 2003 Reissue) 
at para 20.088. 
5  Section 3(1) of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) states 
that “[s]ubject to this Act, the Model Law, with the exception of Chapter VIII 
thereof, shall have the force of law in Singapore”. 
6  Act 23 of 1994 (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed). 
7  W M Reisman,  W L Craig,  W Park  &  J Paulson,  International Commercial 
Arbitration Cases, Materials and Notes on the Resolution of the Business Disputes 
(The Foundation Press, 1997) at p 172. 
8  W M Reisman,  W L Craig,  W Park  &  J Paulson,  International Commercial 
Arbitration Cases, Materials and Notes on the Resolution of the Business Disputes 
(The Foundation Press, 1997) at p 691. 
9  See Jean François Poudret & Sébestien Besson, Comparative Law of International 
Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd Ed, 2007) at p 83: “The arbitration law (lex 
arbitrii) encompasses all provisions governing the arbitration in a given country, 
particularly the formal validity of the arbitration agreement, the arbitrability of the 
dispute, the composition of the arbitral tribunal, fundamental procedural 
guarantees, assistance from the courts and judicial review of the award.” 
10  Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed. 
11  See “Analytical Commentary on draft text of a model law on international 
commercial arbitration: Report of the Secretary-General” UNCITRAL, 18th Sess, 
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5  Parliament’s desire to facilitate international commercial 
arbitration lies at the heart of its decision to enact the IAA.
12 The object 
and purpose of the IAA was to implement the 1985 Model Law in 
Singapore because the Model Law, inter alia, provided an 
“internationally accepted framework for international commercial 
arbitrations” and adopting it would “promote Singapore’s role as a 
growing centre for international legal services and international 
arbitrations”.
13 This “accepted framework” has developed over the years 
and has led to a revision of the Model Law in 2006 (“the 2006 Model 
Law”). 
6  Praising the revised provisions in the 2006 Model Law, the UN 
General Assembly (of which Singapore is a member) stated that these 
provisions reflect “current practices in international trade and modern 
means of contracting with regard to the form of the arbitration and the 
granting of interim measures (which) … will significantly enhance the 
operation of the Model Law” [emphasis added].
14 In line with the 
recognition that the 2006 Model Law reflects worldwide practice, the 
Singapore Ministry of Law (“the Ministry”) recently proposed the 
International Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2009 (“the 2009 Bill”) to 
“refine” the IAA.
15 The Bill represents an effort to ensure that 
Singapore’s laws remain consistent with modern international 
standards. As Law Minister K  Shanmugam observed at the second 
reading of the Bill on 19 October 2009:
16 
[The 2009 Bill] was the result of a consultation process involving key 
industry experts, both local and foreign … We have now taken into 
consideration amendments made to the Model Law by UNCITRAL in 
2006. … [The amendments] are intended to keep our [IAA] modern, 
effective and arbitration-friendly. [emphasis added] 
7  However, while Singapore’s commitment to strengthen its 
world-renowned arbitration framework through the 2009 Bill is 
laudable and the Bill’s drafting process was remarkably consultative,
17 
                                                                                                                                
UN Doc A/CN.9/264 (1985), reprinted in [1985] 16 YB UNCITRAL 104 (“the 1985 
Model Law Commentary”) at 112. 
12  Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed. 
13 See  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (31  October 1994) vol  63 
at col 627 (Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for 
Law). 
14  GA Resolution 61/33 (4 December 2006) reproduced in the preface to the 1985 
Model Law. 
15  Singapore Ministry of Law’s Consultation Paper on the Draft International 
Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2009 dated 27 July 2009 at para 1. 
16  Second Reading Speech by Law Minister K  Shanmugam on the International 
Arbitration (Amendment) Bill available at <http://app2.mlaw.gov.sg/News/tabid/ 
204/Default.aspx?ItemId=439> (accessed 1 February 2010). 
17  The Ministry of Law’s Legal Policy Division led by Ms  Valerie Thean, and the 
Legislation and Law Reform Division of the Attorney-General’s Chambers, led by 
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the Bill’s refinements to the IAA in the context of granting interim 
measures in aid of arbitration are selective. In some respects, the drafters 
of the 2009 Bill have eschewed rather than embraced the 2006 Model 
Law. This article posits that if Singapore intends to promote itself as 
being arbitration-friendly, Parliament should give the High Court better 
guidance, which will in turn give arbitral parties and arbitrators a better 
idea of what to expect from the High Court in terms of curial support 
or intervention in respect of interim measures. 
8  The 2009 Bill’s provisions on court-ordered interim measures 
should be refined for the sake of clarity and certainty, and the IAA 
should be augmented by fresh amendments to the extant law regarding 
arbitral-tribunal ordered interim measures. Specifically, the High Court’s 
discretion under s 12A(3) of the 2009 Bill to refuse to make an interim 
order in relation to foreign arbitration where it considers it to be 
“inappropriate” is ambiguous. This provision ought to more clearly 
define and limit court involvement in support of arbitration. Guidelines 
should be incorporated into s  12A(3) clarifying the scope of such 
involvement. Further, although the Bill only purports to provide 
expressly for court-ordered interim measures, the authors believe that 
Parliament has passed up a good opportunity to guide and provide 
better curial support to arbitral tribunal-ordered interim measures. As it 
stands, s 12 of the IAA does not provide any conditions as to when these 
measures may be ordered, nor does it explain the grounds under which 
the High Court may grant or refuse leave to enforce them. 
II.  The 2009 Bill and court-ordered interim measures – Need for 
refinement 
A.  Significance of the Law Reform Sub-Committee’s 1993 report 
9  The IAA was passed in 1994 based in large measure on the 
recommendations of a Singapore Law Reform Sub-Committee on 
Review of Arbitration Laws (“the Sub-Committee”) that had considered 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, legislation in other jurisdictions and the 
law then existing in Singapore. The Sub-Committee was tasked to 
examine existing laws relating to commercial arbitrations in Singapore 
in the light of international developments in international commercial 
arbitration and to make recommendations for the reform or revision of 
such existing laws. In its 1993 report, the Sub-Committee opined that it 
                                                                                                                                
Parliamentary Counsel Mr Charles Lim, not only welcomed public consultation on 
an annotated version of the Draft 2009 Bill from 27 July 2009 to 17 August 2009 
(“the Consultation Process”), but sought to explain, in summary, their reasons for 
adopting or declining recommendations from members or the public regarding the 
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had dealt with the core issues that could be the basis of a new legislative 
framework for international arbitration in Singapore informed by the 
1985 Model Law.
18 As Prakash J has noted: “This in fact came to pass: the 
[1994] draft [IAA] bill that was proposed to Parliament and which was 
eventually passed was substantially based on the Committee’s 
recommendations.”
19 As a starting point, it would therefore be 
appropriate to consider the Sub-Committee’s comments on the 1985 
Model Law as an aid to the proper interpretation of the IAA’s provisions 
relating to interim relief. 
B.  Article 9 of the 1985 Model Law  
10  Where curial intervention in international arbitration is 
concerned, the pertinent provision of the 1985 Model Law is Art  9, 
which states: 
Article 9. Arbitration agreement and interim measures by court 
It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to 
request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim 
measure of protection and for a court to grant such measure. 
[emphasis added] 
11  The 1985 Model Law Commentary explains that the rationale 
for retaining the court’s jurisdiction over interim measures is to 
promote and facilitate arbitration. According to the authors of the 
Commentary, “the availability of [interim measures of protection from a 
court] is not contrary to the intentions of parties agreeing to submit a 
dispute to arbitration and that the measures themselves are conducive to 
making the arbitration efficient and to securing its expected results” 
[emphasis added].
20 
12  Tellingly, apart from stating that it is “not incompatible” with 
the schema of arbitration envisioned by the rest of the 1985 Model Law, 
Art 9 does not specify the nature and scope of curial assistance as far as 
interim measures are concerned. This was a matter that the drafters of 
the Model Law appear to have left to individual Model Law jurisdictions 
to determine as they saw fit. Peter Binder notes that few details can be 
found in Art 9 regarding the different types of interim measures that are 
                                                                        
18  See the Sub-Committee’s 1993 Report (“the Sub-Committee Report (1993)”) 
para 4. (“In this Report the Committee sets out its views and recommendations on 
each of these issues. It is not intended that this report cover all arguments on the 
issues raised, or all contentious issues relating to international arbitration. The 
Committee believes, however, that this report covers most of the core issues which, 
if the principles expounded are accepted, could be the basis of a new legislative 
framework for international arbitrations in Singapore”.) 
19  Swift-Fortune Ltd v Magnifica Marine SA [2006] 2 SLR(R) 323 at [39]. 
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available, due to their multitude and diversity in different countries; and 
that a number of adopting jurisdictions have made the useful addition 
to Art  9 of listing the details and types of court-ordered interim 
measures allowed under their laws.
21 
13  This is precisely what the Sub-Committee contemplated doing – 
ie, formulating a regime for curial support in terms of interim relief that 
would be suitable for Singapore international arbitrations. At para 31 of 
its report, the Sub-Committee commented that powers to grant interim 
relief “should be made concurrently exercisable by the arbitral tribunal 
and (to the extent that curial intervention is allowed in respect of 
international arbitrations) by the Court, the liberty being given to either 
party to choose to make such applications to the Court or the arbitral 
tribunal as that party deems expedient” [emphasis added].
22 While 
acknowledging the importance of court-ordered interim measures, the 
Sub-Committee was mindful that curial intervention should be 
confined within strict limits. The meaning of the phrase “to the extent 
that curial intervention is allowed in respect of international 
arbitrations” was clarified by the Sub-Committee at para 47 of its report 
as follows:
23 
The [Sub-Committee] recommends that there should be provision to 
empower the court to grant injunctive relief and other orders for the 
interim preservation of property pending the making of an award in an 
international arbitration. Such applications should not be answerable 
by stay applications and should not be considered as an abuse of 
judicial process. The [Sub-Committee] recognises that while 
arbitrators should be given some powers to make such orders [see 
Paragraph 31 above], they should not have the power to make orders 
affecting third party rights; such powers should remain the preserve of 
the courts. [emphasis added by the Sub-Committee in bold; emphasis 
added by the court in bold italics] 
14  It follows that the Sub-Committee clearly intended the court’s 
role in arbitration proceedings to be a narrow one, operating only in 
situations of urgency (for instance, to preserve property pending the 
outcome of arbitration) or where third parties (over which the arbitral 
tribunal has no jurisdiction) are involved.
24 Limiting curial assistance in 
this way was meant to guard against an abuse of judicial process arising 
from an arbitral party delaying arbitration proceedings by taking out 
interim applications in court. 
                                                                        
21 Peter  Binder,  International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL 
Model Law Jurisdictions (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd Ed, 2005) at para 2-097. 
22  Sub-Committee Report (1993) at para 31. 
23 See  NCC International AB v Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 565 
at [33]. 
24 See  NCC International AB v Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 565 
at [34]. 306  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2010) 22 SAcLJ 
 
C.  Section 12(7) of the IAA – Imputing a general principle of 
limited and cautious curial assistance 
15  The provisions relating to the powers of the tribunal and the 
High Court to grant interim relief in aid of arbitration in the 1993 Draft 
IAA Bill proposed by the Sub-Committee were virtually identical to 
those eventually approved by Parliament. In particular, under the IAA,
25 
the court’s power to provide interim relief in international arbitrations 
is prescribed by s 12(7) read with s 12(1). These subsections provide as 
follows: 
Powers of arbitral tribunal 
12.–(1) Without prejudice to the powers set out in any other 
provision of this Act and in the Model Law, an arbitral tribunal shall 
have powers to make orders or give directions to any party for – 
… 
(i)  an interim injunction or any other interim measure. 
… 
(7)  The High Court or a Judge thereof shall have, for the purpose 
of and in relation to an arbitration to which this Part [ie, Pt II of the 
IAA] applies, the same power of making orders in respect of any of the 
matters set out in subsection (1) as it has for the purpose of and in 
relation to an action or matter in the court. 
16  Section 12(7) of the IAA
26 does not give supervisory jurisdiction 
to the High Court with respect to interim relief, but instead confers 
co-extensive powers upon the High Court and the arbitral tribunal to 
grant such relief. Section 12(7) read with s 12(1) of the IAA “merely 
provides an alternative for the parties to apply to the High Court if 
applications for interlocutory relief may not be conveniently made to 
the tribunal or if it is more expedient to do so in court” .
27 Belinda Ang J 
in  Front Carriers Ltd v Atlantic & Orient Shipping Corp (“Front 
Carriers”) remarked that the interim measures of protection in s 12(1) 
of the IAA “are essentially remedies aimed at assisting in the just and 
proper conduct of arbitration, or in the preservation of property which 
is the subject matter of the arbitration”.
28 
17  Section 12(7) of the IAA
29 is substantially similar to s 12(6) of 
the UK Arbitration Act 1950
30 (“the 1950 UK Act”). Section 12(6) of the 
                                                                        
25  Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed. 
26  Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed. 
27  Leslie K H Chew, Singapore Arbitration Handbook (LexisNexis, 2003) at p 105. 
28  [2006] 3 SLR(R) 854 at [15]. Affirmed by the Court of Appeal in NCC International 
AB v Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 565 at [28]. 
29  Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed. 
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1950 UK Act is therefore relevant in interpreting the IAA and the 
Arbitration Act.
31 According to Sir Michael Mustill and Stewart Boyd, 
the position under s 12(6) of the 1950 UK Act is as follows:
32 
Under section 12(6) of the Act, the High Court has power to make 
certain procedural orders in a reference, by way of reinforcement of the 
arbitrator’s own powers. … 
In certain respects, namely the ordering of discovery and 
interrogatories, the powers of the Court duplicate those of the 
arbitrator. When a party wishes to avail himself of these over-lapping 
powers, he should first have recourse to the arbitrator, and should not 
invoke the Court’s power unless the arbitrator’s order proves ineffectual. 
[emphasis added] 
18  Section 12(7) of the IAA
33 therefore embodies (albeit tacitly) the 
schema of the IAA as a whole – ie, that curial assistance is a supportive 
function in relation to arbitration proceedings and the court will 
intervene only sparingly and in very narrow circumstances. Examples of 
such circumstances include those where third parties over whom the 
arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction are involved, where matters are very 
urgent or where the court’s coercive powers of enforcement are 
required.
34  As  V K Rajah JA  held  in  NCC International AB v Alliance 
Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd (“NCC International”):
35 
29  We regard the genesis and the context of s 12(7) of the IAA as 
pointing towards limited curial intervention for two reasons. First, the 
court’s power in respect of interim measures is contained in a single 
subsection of a provision which bears the heading, “Powers of arbitral 
tribunal” … Evidently, precedence is given to the arbitral tribunal to 
provide interim relief, with the court’s power being incidental to that of 
the tribunal. Second, reading the IAA as a whole, it can be seen that the 
designated functions of the court are purely supportive in nature … 
Clearly, ss 12(1) and 12(7) of the IAA must be read in a way which is 
consistent with the overall scheme of curial assistance contemplated 
by this Act. 
30  In our view, therefore, a contextual interpretation of ss 12(1) 
and 12(7) of the IAA unequivocally points towards the court’s powers 
being employed only to the extent that the exercise of such powers would 
essentially aid arbitration proceedings being or to be diligently pursued. 
In short, the court’s role is to assist in the arbitration process and not 
to resolve the dispute at hand either directly or indirectly. 
                                                                        
31  Cap 10, 2002 Rev Ed. 
32  Sir Michael J  Mustill & Stewart C  Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial 
Arbitration in England (Butterworths, 2nd Ed, 1989) at p 296. 
33  Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed. 
34  See David St John Sutton & Judith Gill, Russell on Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 
Limited, 22nd Ed, 2003) at para 7-138. 
35  [2008] 2 SLR(R) 565. 308  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2010) 22 SAcLJ 
 
… 
40  … parties ought not to be allowed to bypass seeking interim 
measures from an arbitral tribunal merely because curial assistance is 
conceivably available. Rather, help from the court is to be sought only 
when arbitration is inappropriate, ineffective or incapable of securing 
the particular form of relief sought. 
41  In summary, under the IAA regime, although the court has 
concurrent jurisdiction with the arbitral tribunal to order interim 
measures,  the court will nevertheless scrupulously avoid usurping the 
functions of the arbitral tribunal in exercising such jurisdiction and will 
only order interim relief where this will aid, promote and support 
arbitration proceedings. 
[emphasis added] 
D.  Section 12A of the 2009 Bill – Codifying the general principle 
of limited and cautious curial assistance 
19  With the advent of the 2009 Bill, one no longer has to parse case 
law or review the IAA’s drafting history to surmise that our courts will, 
as V K Rajah JA notes, “scrupulously avoid usurping the functions of the 
arbitral tribunal in exercising such jurisdiction and will only order 
interim relief where this will aid, promote and support arbitration 
proceedings”.
36 Section 12(7) of the IAA will soon be replaced by s 12A 
of the 2009 Bill, ss 12A(2) and 12A(4) to 12A(7) of which unequivocally 
codify and clarify this general principle of limited and cautious curial 
assistance in aid of arbitrations: 
Court-ordered interim measures 
12A … 
(2)  Subject to subsections (3) to (6), for the purpose of and in 
relation to an arbitration referred to in subsection(1), the High Court 
or a Judge thereof shall have the same power of making an order in 
respect of any of the matters set out in section 12(1)(c) to (f) as it has 
for the purpose of and in relation to an action or matter in the court.  
… 
(4)  If the case is one of urgency, the High Court or a Judge 
thereof may, on the application of a party or proposed party to the 
arbitral proceedings, make such orders under subsection (2) as it 
thinks necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets. 
(5)  If the case is not one of urgency, the High Court or a Judge 
thereof shall make an order under subsection (2) only on the 
application of a party to the arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the 
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other parties and to the arbitral tribunal) made with the permission of 
the arbitral tribunal or the agreement in writing of the other parties. 
(6)  In every case, the High Court or a Judge thereof shall make 
an order under subsection (2) only if or to the extent that the arbitral 
tribunal, and any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the 
parties with power in that regard, has no power or is unable for the 
time being to act effectively. 
(7)  An order made by the High Court or a Judge thereof under 
subsection (2) shall cease to have effect in whole or in part if the 
arbitral tribunal, or any such arbitral or other institution or person 
having power to act in relation to the subject-matter of the order, 
makes an order which expressly relates to the whole or part of the 
order under subsection (2). 
20  Section 12A of the 2009 Bill brings the IAA “in line with 
legislation in other countries such as the UK”.
37 I n  f a c t ,  s   1 2 A  i s  i n  
pari materia with s  44 of the 1996 UK Arbitration Act.
38 Professor 
Robert Merkin describes the English position under s  44, and by 
extension the Singapore position once s 12A of the 2009 Bill comes into 
effect, as follows:
39 
The High Court apparently had [under the 1950 UK Act] the 
discretion to refuse to exercise its powers on the basis that there had 
not been an initial application to the arbitrators. The position has 
been maintained, and clarified, by the [1996 UK Act], s  44. The 
relationship between the arbitrators and the court is now as follows. 
(a)  The overriding rule is that the court shall act only if or to the 
extent that the arbitral tribunal has no power or is unable for the time 
being to act effectively. … 
(b)  Where an application is made to the court, it may normally 
act only if permission has been given by the arbitrators or the 
agreement of the other parties to the arbitration has been obtained. … 
However, exceptionally, the court may on the application of a party 
make an order preserving the subject matter of the dispute in the case 
of urgency without the permission of the tribunal or the consent of 
the other parties. 
21  Clearly, the pre-existing principle of limited curial intervention 
under the 1950 UK Arbitration Act in respect of interim measures has 
been preserved by the 1996 UK Arbitration Act. The English Court of 
Appeal has reinforced this principle in Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd
40 
                                                                        
37  Singapore Ministry of Law’s Consultation Paper on the Draft International 
Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2009 dated 27 July 2009 at para 3(a). 
38  Arbitration Act 1996 (c 23) (UK). 
39 Robert  Merkin,  Arbitration Law (Informa, Looseleaf Ed, 1991, Service Issue No 46, 
22 May 2007) at para 14.50. 
40  [2005] 1 WLR 3555. 310  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2010) 22 SAcLJ 
 
which concerned an application for an interim mandatory injunction 
pending arbitration pursuant to s 44 of the 1996 UK Act. There, the 
English Court of Appeal held that: 
The whole purpose of giving the court power to make such orders is 
to assist the arbitral process in cases of urgency before there is an 
arbitration on foot. Otherwise, it is all too easy for a party who is bent 
on a policy of non-cooperation to frustrate the arbitral process. Of 
course, in any case where the court is called upon to exercise the power 
[under s 44 of the 1996 UK Act], it must take great care not to usurp 
the arbitral process and to ensure, by exacting appropriate 
undertakings from the claimant, that the substantive questions are 
reserved for the arbitrator or arbitrators. 
22  It can therefore be said with much force that even after the 
enactment of the 2009 Bill, Singapore’s position on curial assistance in 
the context of interim relief in international arbitration will be largely 
similar to that under the IAA
41 as it currently stands. 
E.  Section 12A of the 2009 Bill – An adequate legislative response 
to the conflict between Swift Fortune and Front Carrier? 
23  The new s 12A of the 2009 Bill is not merely designed to be 
declaratory in nature. It appears to have been introduced as a response 
to the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in Swift-Fortune Ltd v 
Magnifica Marine SA
42 (“Swift-Fortune”). In that case, the parties entered 
into a memorandum of agreement for the sale of a vessel and which 
provided for disputes to be referred to arbitration in London. A Mareva 
injunction was obtained by the plaintiffs, restraining the defendant from 
removing or in any way disposing of or dealing with or diminishing the 
value of its assets in Singapore up to the value of US$2.5m. 
24  In the subsequent application by the defendants to set aside the 
Mareva injunction, parties canvassed arguments on s 12(7) of the IAA.
43 
Prakash  J ruled in favour of the defendant, holding that s  12(7) 
conferred powers on the court to grant Mareva interlocutory relief to 
assist “Singapore international arbitrations” but not “foreign 
arbitrations”, the latter referring to arbitrations arising out of 
international arbitration agreements which do not stipulate Singapore 
as the seat of arbitration. The Court of Appeal agreed with Prakash J 
that s 12(7) of the IAA did not apply to foreign arbitrations, but only 
Singapore international arbitrations. The Court of Appeal was reluctant 
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to apply s 12(7) to arbitrations outside Singapore for fear of, inter alia, 
offending the principle of comity:
44 
48  … the exercise of such powers may cut across or intrude into 
the powers of the foreign arbitral tribunal conducting the arbitration 
under a foreign law. Given these implications, the question that 
naturally arises is whether Parliament intended s 12(7) to have this 
effect. 
49  A similar issue arose in Channel Tunnel in connection with 
s 12(6)(h) of the 1950 Act. The appellants made two arguments that 
an English court had the power to grant an interim injunction in aid 
of an arbitration in Belgium under that provision. Lord Mustill dealt 
with the first argument as follows, at 357–360: 
… 
[T]he court should bear constantly in mind that English law, 
like French law, is a stranger to this Belgian arbitration, and 
that the respondents are not before the English court by 
choice. In such a situation the court should be very cautious in 
its approach both to the existence and to the exercise of 
supervisory and supportive measures, lest it cut across the 
grain of the chosen curial law. 
… 
It seems to be absolutely plain for two reasons that 
Parliament cannot have intended these provisions to apply to 
a foreign arbitration. The first reason is that the chosen 
mechanism was to make these provisions into implied terms 
of the arbitration agreement, and such terms could not 
sensibly be incorporated into an agreement governed by 
foreign domestic arbitration law to whose provisions they 
might well be antithetical … 
… 
52  Having regard to these considerations, it is clear that if a 
literal interpretation is given to the phrase ‘an arbitration to which 
Part II applies’ in s 12(7), that phrase would allow the courts to exercise 
p o w e r s  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  c o n t r a r y  to the spirit of international 
arbitrations. On the other hand, if s 12(7) is read to apply to 
Singapore international arbitrations only, these difficulties would not 
arise. This, in our view, is a compelling reason for concluding that 
Parliament could not have intended s 12(7) to apply s 12(1) to foreign 
arbitrations. 
[emphasis added in bold italics; emphasis added by the court in 
italics] 
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25  Further, the court found that s  12(7) of the IAA
45 does not 
independently confer on the court any powers to grant interim 
measures but draws its powers from s  4(10) of the Civil Law Act
46 
(“CLA”). According to the court, s 4(10) of the CLA can serve as a basis 
for the court to grant a Mareva injunction against the assets of a 
defendant in Singapore if the plaintiff has an accrued cause of action 
against the defendant that is justiciable in Singapore. Section 4(10) 
states: 
(10)  A Mandatory Order or an injunction may be granted or a 
receiver appointed by an interlocutory order of the court, either 
unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court 
thinks just, in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or 
convenient that such order should be made. 
26  In Front Carriers,
47 Belinda Ang J held that s 4(10) of the CLA
48 
empowered it to grant interim orders to aid foreign arbitration where 
the applicant had a cause of action justiciable in Singapore against a 
respondent over whom the High Court had personal jurisdiction. While 
the Court of Appeal in Swift Fortune
49 did not disapprove of the ruling 
in  Front Carriers on the scope of s  4(10) of the CLA, it considered 
whether s 4(10) affords wider statutory powers to the High Court in 
respect of ordering interim relief than s 12(7) of the IAA
50 does: 
93  … We have earlier decided that s 12(7) of the IAA applies 
only to Singapore international arbitrations, and not to foreign 
arbitrations. The question that immediately arises is whether in these 
circumstances, s 4(10) of the CLA can have a broader area of application 
than s 12(7) of the IAA. 
94  … Given that Parliament ignored s 4(10) of the CLA entirely 
when it enacted the IAA to provide a new statutory framework for 
international arbitrations in Singapore, a court would need to know 
why it was necessary to enact s 12(7) of the IAA if the court had power 
under s 4(10) to grant Mareva relief in aid of foreign arbitrations. 
Perhaps it was simply a case of Parliament’s attention not having been 
drawn to the need to provide a broader framework to deal with interim 
measures to assist foreign proceedings, whether court or arbitral 
proceedings. 
[emphasis added] 
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27  The apparent conflict between Swift Fortune
51 and Front 
Carriers
52 stems from the reluctance of the Court of Appeal in the 
former to expressly overrule the High Court in the latter, on the point 
that s  4(10) of the CLA
53 empowered the courts to provide curial 
assistance to foreign arbitration. The two decisions created the 
possibility of side-stepping s 12(7) by seeking curial assistance in foreign 
arbitration under s 4(10) of the CLA. The new s 12A therefore seeks to 
bring clarity to the common law confusion by laying down the rule that 
the courts may lend curial assistance to foreign arbitration where 
necessary. Section 12A(1) enables the High Court or a judge thereof to 
grant interim orders in aid of arbitrations held outside Singapore in 
certain circumstances, in line with the new Art 17J of the revised Model 
Law,
54 which was inserted by the UNCITRAL in 2006.
55 In addition, the 
proposed s  12A(3) gives the courts the discretion to refuse to grant 
interim orders to assist a foreign arbitration if the court considers, in its 
opinion, it “inappropriate” to do so. The Ministry’s Consultation Paper 
on the 2009 Bill states that s 12A(3) is an added safeguard to give the 
court sufficient flexibility to deal with complicated international 
disputes.
56 
28  Section 12A(1) and (3) of the 2009 Bill provide as follows: 
Court-ordered interim measures 
12A.–(1)   This section shall apply in relation to an arbitration – 
(a)  to which this Part applies; and 
(b)  irrespective of whether the place of arbitration is in 
the territory of Singapore. 
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… 
(3)  The High Court or a Judge thereof may refuse to make an 
order under subsection (2) if, in the opinion of the High Court or 
Judge, the fact that the place of arbitration is outside Singapore or likely 
to be outside Singapore when it is designated or determined makes it 
inappropriate to make such order. 
[emphasis added] 
29  In addition to Art 17J of the 2006 Model Law, ss 12A(1) and 
12A(3) are inspired by s 2(3) of the 1996 UK Arbitration Act,
57 which 
states: 
(3)  The powers conferred by the following sections apply even if 
the seat of the arbitration is outside England and Wales or Northern 
Ireland or no seat has been designated or determined – 
… 
(b)  section 44 (court powers exercisable in support of 
arbitral proceedings); 
but the court may refuse to exercise any such power if, in the opinion 
of the court, the fact that the seat of the arbitration is outside England 
a n d  W a l e s  o r  N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d ,  o r  t h a t  w h e n  d e s i g n a t e d  o r  
d e t e r m i n e d  t h e  s e a t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  o u t s i d e  E n g l a n d  a n d  W a l e s  o r  
Northern Ireland, makes it inappropriate to do so. 
30  Although it is commendable that the Ministry has sought to 
introduce a new framework for “court-ordered interim measures” in 
place of s  12(7) of the IAA,
58 it is unclear whether this framework 
adequately deals with the court’s concerns in Swift-Fortune
59 or 
constitutes the broad “framework to deal with interim measures to assist 
foreign proceedings, whether court or arbitral proceedings”, that the 
Court of Appeal in that case had in mind. In particular, there are several 
issues which should be resolved by Parliament or the courts. 
31  First, the new s 12A(3) of the 2009 Bill does not provide any 
guidelines as to when it would be “inappropriate” to grant an interim 
order because the arbitration is designated or determined to be held 
outside Singapore. This could render s 12A(3) vague and unhelpful to 
parties. Without further elucidation, the net effect of s 12A(1) read with 
s 12A(3) appears, rather tautologically, to be that the High Court can 
order interim relief in aid of foreign arbitration although the very fact 
that the arbitration is overseas could make it inappropriate to provide 
such curial assistance. It can only be surmised that the “inappropriate” 
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test in s  12A(3) is inspired by the principle of comity, which the 
Ministry acknowledges is a “fundamental principle”.
60 Although the 
Ministry opines, and the authors agree, that this principle need not be 
expressly stated in the 2009 Bill, at minimum, the Explanatory 
Statement to the 2009 Bill should emphasise the important role the 
principle of comity plays in determining an “inappropriate” interim 
relief for the purposes of s 12A(3) of the Bill. The Statement should 
make it clear that s 12A(3), like its English counterpart, s 2(3) of the 
1996 UK Arbitration Act, “is there to counter any suggestion that by 
conferring jurisdiction in this way Parliament is indicating that the 
absence of a seat link is an irrelevant factor when deciding whether to 
exercise the jurisdiction”.
61 
32  Second, reading s 12A(3) together with s 12A(5), it appears that 
the High Court may refrain from granting interim relief on the ground 
that it would be “inappropriate” to do so, despite having the tribunal’s 
permission and/or the parties’ written consent to do so. This cuts 
against the grain of the IAA and the spirit of the 1985 and 2006 Model 
Law, which, as we have seen, defer to party autonomy. Further, s 12A(3) 
permits the High Court to refrain from exercising its power under 
s 12A, but does not specify if there are exceptional circumstances, such 
as fraud, that render curial assistance in aid of foreign arbitration 
“appropriate”, even if there is no seat link between Singapore and the 
arbitration and/or substantial assets in Singapore to justify curial 
assistance. 
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… 
[I]n the absence of any exceptional feature such as fraud, and in the absence 
of substantial assets … located here, the fact that the seat of the arbitration is 
not here makes it inappropriate to grant an order under s 2(3) of the 1996 
Act. 
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33  Third, given that the Court of Appeal in Swift-Fortune
62 
emphasised that Parliament should be made aware of the need for a 
legislative framework for interim relief in foreign proceedings, “whether 
court or arbitral”,
63 it follows that the provisions relating to curial 
assistance in the CLA
64 and the IAA
65 should be harmonised. In other 
words, the determination of whether interim relief is “inappropriate” 
under s  12A(3) of the 2009 Bill should include considerations of 
whether the High Court has personal jurisdiction over the respondent 
to an application and whether a recognisable cause of action has arisen 
under Singapore law. Although the Court of Appeal in Swift Fortune 
held that “[t]he existence of the court’s personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant in itself does not give power to the court to grant a Mareva 
injunction in aid of a foreign arbitration”,
66 these twin considerations 
could be elements or guidelines for courts to take into account when 
determining if s  12A(3) is triggered. This would in turn lead to the 
development of a autochthonous corpus of Singapore case law 
concerning the scope of the elements or guidelines of s 12A(3) of the 
2009 Bill, instead of leaving arbitral parties and judges to have to fathom 
the meaning of phrases such as “inappropriate”, which, as Andrew 
Hutcheon astutely notes, “add very little to understanding the particular 
issues involved”.
67 
34  In response to the authors’ call for greater clarity to be inserted 
into the “inappropriate” test in s  12A(3), the Ministry replied that 
introducing the phrase “justiciable”, which was relied upon by the Court 
of Appeal in Swift-Fortune,
68 i s  l i k e l y  t o  “ o p e n  t h e  d o o r  t o  f u r t h e r  
litigation as what is meant by ‘justiciable’ is not entirely clear”.
69 This is 
not entirely accurate. Unlike the amorphous phrase “inappropriate”, it is 
well settled that a cause of action is justiciable in Singapore if it satisfies 
two requirements: (a) the court asked to grant interim relief must have 
jurisdiction over the defendant whether by service of process within the 
country or permitted service of process outside of the country;
70 and 
(b) the claim must relate to a legal or equitable right or interest which is 
enforceable in Singapore (regardless of whether it is ultimately enforced 
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here) by a final judgment of the High Court.
71 It is far more likely that 
the flood of litigation, which the Ministry fears, may ensue in relation to 
the lay phrase “inappropriate” than “justiciable”, which is a legal term of 
art as far as conflict of laws is concerned. 
F. Recommendation 
35  Based on the arguments above, s 12A(3) of the 2009 Bill should 
be redrafted (proposed amendments in italics) as follows: 
(3)  The High Court or a Judge thereof may refuse to make an 
order under subsection (2) if, in the opinion of the High Court or 
Judge, the fact that the place of arbitration is outside Singapore or 
likely to be outside Singapore when it is designated or determined 
makes it inappropriate to make such order, taking into account whether 
the applicant has a justiciable cause of action under the laws of 
Singapore. 
III.  Arbitral tribunal-ordered interim measures – A missed 
opportunity 
36  The 2009 Bill provides expressly for the powers of the High 
Court to make certain orders in support of international arbitration in 
response to Swift-Fortune,
72 but makes no effort to revise or update the 
IAA
73 in view of the 2006 amendments to Art  17 of the Model Law 
regarding the court’s role in recognising or enforcing arbitral tribunal-
ordered measures. 
A.  Article 17 of the 1985 Model Law – Identifying the “lacuna” 
37  Article 17 of the 1985 Model Law empowered arbitral tribunals 
to grant interim relief as follows: 
Article 17. Power of arbitral tribunal to order interim measures 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the 
request of a party, order any party to take such interim measure of 
protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in respect of 
the subject-matter of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any 
party to provide appropriate security in connection with such 
measure. [emphasis added] 
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38  Although Art 17 of the 1985 Model Law confers considerable 
discretion on the arbitral tribunal, it gives no guidance on what sort of 
interim measures may be granted and under what conditions they may 
be considered “necessary” to aid international arbitrations. Further, 
Art 17 does not expressly specify the status and effect of such measures – 
ie, are interim measures granted pursuant to Art 17 enforceable arbitral 
awards, and if not, what are the grounds for recognising or refusing 
their enforcement? 
39  It appears that the drafters of the 1985 Model Law preferred to 
leave these issues pertaining to the scope, status and enforceability of 
interim relief to be determined by the domestic law and procedure of 
the Model Law jurisdictions. Indeed, this approach is in line with the 
overall character of the 1985 Model Law and the recognition by the UN 
General Assembly that “the establishment of a model law on arbitration 
that is acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic 
systems contributes to the development of harmonious international 
economic relations”.
74 
40  Summarising the relevant sections of the 1985 Model Law 
Commentary
 and other UNCITRAL preparatory materials,
75 the editors 
of A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary
76 had this to say in 
respect of Art 17 of the 1985 Model Law:
77 
There was some sentiment for specifically limiting the measures that 
could be taken to ‘measures for conserving, or maintaining the value 
of, the goods forming the subject matter in dispute’, but ultimately the 
broader power was approved that provided for any measures of 
protection in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. … A third 
question of policy that was addressed was the question of the arbitral 
tribunal’s power to enforce the interim measure it orders. The 
Secretariat drafted a sentence to provide that the arbitral tribunal could 
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request a court to render executory assistance. The Working Group 
ultimately decided not to address this question because it touched on 
matters dealt with in laws of national procedure and court competence 
and would probably be unacceptable to many States. The question of 
execution of interim measures is thus not dealt within the (Model) Law 
and is governed by other provisions of domestic law. [emphasis added] 
41  In formulating the 1993 Draft IAA Bill to adopt and augment 
the 1985 Model Law, the Sub-Committee recommended, inter alia, that 
in order to enable “the proper functioning of international arbitrations 
in Singapore … arbitral powers given by statute must be substantially 
increased”. The Sub-Committee added that “the Model Law provisions 
should be expanded to include the powers set out in the UNCITRAL 
Rules, SIAC Rules and such other powers as a Court should have, such 
as … interim injunctions or other interim orders”, lest there be a 
“lacuna” in the Model Law with respect to the scope and enforceability 
of arbitral tribunal-ordered interim measures of protection. 
Paragraphs 32 to 35 of the Sub-Committee’s 1993 Report deserve to be 
quoted in extenso: 
Article 17 of the Model Law provides that the arbitral tribunal may 
order any party to take such interim measures as the tribunal deems 
necessary. The Article does not expressly state that any such interim order 
is to constitute an interim award, nor does it provide any method of 
enforcing any such interim orders … 
The Hong Kong Law Reform Commission did not make any 
suggestion on the point but the Australian Working Group 
recommended that an ‘award’ should be defined to include interim 
awards and that interim awards should be made capable of being made 
on many matters including costs. The New Zealand approach was most 
comprehensive, since it amended Article 17 so as to award status to orders 
for interim protection. The amended Article 17 also makes it clear that 
the powers of enforcement in Articles 35 and 36 apply to interim orders. 
There is a lacuna in the Model Law which the Committee feels should be 
filled. Quite apart from the desirability of the arbitrators having power 
in appropriate circumstances to make partial awards during the course 
of the proceedings and also awards for costs, there is a need for the 
arbitrator to be able to make interim procedural orders. Such orders will 
help expedite the proceedings and also ensure that the award finally 
made is not a mere ‘paper award’. Arbitrators should be able to make 
orders for discovery and inspection of documents and other relevant 
evidence, the issue of interrogatories, the submission of evidence 
(eg damaged goods) to expert appraisal, and orders relating to interim 
preservation of property. Such orders may also need to be given the 
status of awards in order to be enforceable. If the arbitral tribunal has the 
power to make interim awards on a wide range of matters then, first 
judicial interference with arbitral proceedings will be minimised and, 
secondly, the parties will be able to get efficient and expeditious interim 
relief. 320  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2010) 22 SAcLJ 
 
The Committee therefore recommends that when the arbitral tribunal 
makes interim orders and/or directions pursuant to powers of the 
kind contemplated in Paragraph 31 above, curial assistance should be 
available such that the interim orders and/or directions may be 
registered with the courts for enforcement as an administrative 
process. 
[emphasis added] 
B.  Section 12(6) of the IAA – Empowering the arbitral tribunal 
42  A s  m e n t i o n e d ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  
tribunal and the High Court to grant interim relief in aid of arbitration 
in the 1993 Draft IAA Bill proposed by the Sub-Committee were 
virtually identical to those eventually approved by Parliament. In 
particular, under the IAA,
78 the arbitral tribunal’s power to provide 
interim relief in international arbitrations is prescribed by s 12(6) read 
with s 12(1). These subsections provide as follows: 
Powers of arbitral tribunal 
12.–(1) Without prejudice to the powers set out in any other 
provision of this Act and in the Model Law, an arbitral tribunal shall 
have powers to make orders or give directions to any party for – 
… 
(i)  an interim injunction or any other interim measure. 
… 
(6)  All orders or directions made or given by an arbitral tribunal 
in the course of an arbitration shall, by leave of the High Court or a 
Judge thereof, be enforceable in the same manner as if they were 
orders made by a court and, where leave is so given, judgment may be 
entered in terms of the order or direction. 
43  At first glance, it appears that s 12 of the IAA
79 addresses the 
Sub-Committee’s concerns with respect to tribunal-ordered interim 
measures and assists the High Court to strike the right balance between 
intervening in arbitration to grant interim relief and holding the parties 
to their arbitration agreement. After all, s  12(1) of the IAA 
commendably enumerates a range of interim measures that an arbitral 
tribunal or the High Court is empowered to make to assist international 
arbitration. These measures mirror interim and interlocutory orders 
that are often granted by Singapore courts in local litigation, including 
discovery of documents, preservation of evidence and the provision of 
security for costs. 
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44  Moreover, s 12(6) of the IAA
80 confers, with leave from the High 
Court, arbitral tribunal-ordered interim measures the same status and 
enforceability of judicial orders, thereby ensuring that such orders “help 
expedite the proceedings and also ensure that the award finally made is 
not a mere ‘paper award’”.
81 A plain reading of s 12 of the IAA reveals 
that an order or direction in an international arbitration, unlike an 
award, cannot be set aside by Singapore courts. There is no mechanism 
in s  12 or, for that matter, in any other section of the IAA, for an 
application to be made to the courts to set aside an order or direction 
made by an arbitral tribunal; nor are the courts empowered to do so. 
45  In fact, in November 2001, Parliament specifically amended the 
definition of an award in s 2 of the IAA
82 to clarify that an “award means 
a decision of the arbitral tribunal on the substance of the dispute and 
includes any interim, interlocutory or partial award but excludes any 
orders or directions made under section 12” [emphasis added]. There is no 
judicial recourse against interim measures made under s 12(6) of the 
IAA:
83 not being awards, they cannot be set aside under s 24 of the IAA 
or Art 35 of the Model Law.
84 Even if interim relief is framed in the form 
of an award, as opposed to an order or direction, the definition of an 
award in s  2 bars it from being judicially interfered with.
85 
Differentiating between the status and effect of an interim award from 
an interim order is consistent with that of other Model Law 
jurisdictions, where courts have held that it is the substance of an 
arbitral ruling, and not its form, that is determinative of whether it will 
be treated as having the effect of an arbitral award.
86 
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83  Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed. 
84  Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore (vol  2, “Arbitration”) (LexisNexis, 2003 Reissue) 
at  p  93. (“Decisions on interlocutory matters pertaining to procedure such as 
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85 Lawrence  Boo,  The Law and Practice of Arbitration in Singapore (ICCA Supplement 
No 38, April 2003) (Kluwer) at p 183. See also Lawrence Boo, “Interim measures 
and the arbitral Institution: A Singapore Perspective”, paper presented at ICC 
International Court of Arbitration and SIAC Symposium on Institutional 
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Condominiums v Bolwell” (1994) 10 Arbitration International 385 at pp 388–390. In 
Resort Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell 118 ALR 655, the Supreme Court 
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purpose of the New York Convention as it purported to grant some interlocutory 
remedy otherwise than on the merits of the substantive issues in dispute. Lee J held 
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46  Given that no statutory power is conferred upon the Singapore 
courts to review, restrain or reverse an order or direction under s 12 of 
the IAA,
87 Singapore courts are likely to take the view that they cannot 
a n d / o r  w i l l  n o t  e x e r c i s e  a n y  i n h e r e n t  o r  r e s i d u a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  s o  
intervene. Put differently, as a general rule, Singapore courts will only 
intervene in international arbitrations to the extent that curial 
intervention is expressly permitted in respect of international 
arbitrations.
88 That principle is contained in Art 5 of the 1985 Model 
Law which provides that “[i]n matters governed by [the Model] Law, no 
court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law”. 
47  The Singapore High Court’s decision in Mitsui Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Easton Graham Rush
89 (“Mitsui”) illustrates that, 
in view of Art 5 of the Model Law, Singapore courts will refrain from 
taking an interventionist approach in international arbitrations. The 
issue before the court in Mitsui was whether there was any jurisdiction 
or judicial power to grant an injunction against an arbitrator to prevent 
him from proceeding with the arbitration pending a decision on his 
removal or recourse against an interim award. Mitsui suggested that 
there was a residual power lying with the court to make such an order, 
arguing that as the law allows the court to set aside an award on grounds 
no less serious than the power to remove an arbitrator, it must follow 
that the court would have a residual power to grant an interlocutory 
injunction under Art 34 of the 1985 Model Law and s 24 of the IAA,
90 if 
not under Art 13 of the 1985 Model Law, in order not to render the 
court’s eventual decision on the application to set aside an award 
nugatory. 
48  After a thorough review of the drafting history of Art 5 of the 
Model Law, the High Court rejected this argument. Woo Bih Li J held, 
inter alia, as follows:
91 
I t s e e me d  t o  me  th a t M i ts u i ’ s  a r g u me n t w e n t a ga i n s t t h e  t e rms  o f 
Art  5 which states that in matters governed by the Model Law, no 
court shall intervene ‘except where so provided’ in the Model Law. 
                                                                                                                                
as follows: “These orders, as well as the orders made by the District Court Judge on 
14 July 1993, are clearly of an interlocutory and procedural nature and in no way 
purport to finally resolve the disputes referred by [the applicant] for decision or to 
finally resolve the legal rights of the parties. They are provisional only and liable to 
be rescinded, suspended, varied or re-opened by the tribunal which pronounced 
them.” 
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88  See Michael Hwang, “The State of International Commercial Arbitration in 
Singapore” in ICC Court of Arbitration Bulletin entitled “International 
Commercial Arbitration in Asia – Special Supplement” (November 1998) at p 47. 
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Since the Model Law does not provide for the Interlocutory Injunction 
in respect of an application under Arts 13 and 24, the court does not 
have the power to do so. 
C.  Leaving the “lacuna” exposed 
49  Yet, the “lacuna” identified by the Sub-Committee in its 1993 
report has not been entirely filled. Section 12(6) of the IAA
92 omits any 
reference to the conditions, requirements or relevant principles for the 
granting of such interim measures. Consequently, international arbitral 
tribunals applying Singapore law as the lex arbitri have had to bridge 
this omission by relying on conditions espoused by scholars,
93 regardless 
of whether these conditions comport with Singapore law or general 
principles of international law concerning interim or interlocutory 
injunctions, orders and directions.
94 
50  Moreover, s 12(6) of the IAA
95 does not adequately provide for 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral tribunal-ordered interim 
measures. It bears repeating that in considering how to strengthen the 
e n f o r c e a b i l i t y  o f  s u c h  m e a s u r e s  s o  t h a t  t h e y  d o  n o t  b e c o m e  m e r e  
“paper” awards, the Sub-Committee considered the Australian position, 
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plaintiff satisfies the above-mentioned tests, the grant or refusal of an injunction is 
a matter for the exercise of the court’s discretion on the balance of convenience: see 
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (No 1) [1975] AC 396; Bengawan Solo Pte Ltd 
v Season Confectionery Co (Pte) Ltd [1994] 1 SLR(R) 448. 
95  Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed. 324  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2010) 22 SAcLJ 
 
where interim orders are called or given the status of interim awards
96 as 
well as, in the Sub-Committee’s words, the “comprehensive” New 
Zealand position, which had amended its application of Art 17 of the 
1985 Model Law to make it clear that the powers of recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards under Arts 35 and 36 apply to interim 
orders.
97 
51  A shortcoming of the IAA
98 is that despite clarifying through s 2 
that interim measures are procedural orders that should not be elevated 
to the status of interim awards, as they are in Australia, it left the lacuna 
unaltered: it does not apply the New Zealand approach of providing a 
separate regime for the recognition and enforcement of interim 
measures under s  12(6). When this shortcoming was brought to the 
attention of the Ministry by the authors during the 2009 Bill’s 
consultation process, the Ministry remarked as follows: 
Although section 2 of the IAA provides that interim orders are 
excluded from being awards, section 12(6) and (7) of the IAA provides 
expressly for the enforcement of interim measures ordered by a tribunal 
seated in Singapore. It was not then intended to refer to interim orders 
made by a foreign arbitral tribunal. This was affirmed by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Swift Fortune [2006] SGCA 42 when the 
Court of Appeal held at paragraph 59 that section 12(7) was not 
intended to apply to foreign arbitrations. [emphasis added] 
52  The Ministry’s response presumes that the proposed review of 
the IAA
99 should only seek to amend s 12(7) of the IAA in the aftermath 
of Swift-Fortune
100 on the basis that there is nothing about s 12(6) that 
deserves to be remedied since it “provides expressly for the enforcement 
of interim measures ordered by a tribunal seated in Singapore”. This 
presumption does not rest on firm ground and should be revisited. 
Although s  12(6) contemplates enforcement, with leave of the High 
Court, it provides no guidance as to the circumstances under which 
such leave shall be granted or denied by the High Court. Order 69A r 5 
of the Singapore Rules of Court under the Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act,
101 which purports to govern the enforcement of interim orders 
m a d e  u n d e r  s   1 2  o f  t h e  I A A ,  i s  e q u a l l y  u n h e l p f u l  –  f o r m a l i s t i c a l l y  
requiring that the applicant abide by an undertaking as to damages, but 
providing no further assistance to the High Court: 
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Enforcement of interlocutory orders or directions (O.69A, r.5) 
5.—(1) An application for leave to enforce an order or direction 
given by an arbitral tribunal must be supported by an affidavit: 
(a)  exhibiting a copy of the arbitration agreement and 
the original order or direction made by the arbitral tribunal 
sought to be enforced; and 
(b)  stating the provisions in the Act or the applicable 
rules adopted in the arbitration on which the applicant relies. 
(2)  Where the order sought to be enforced is in the nature of an 
interim injunction under section 12(1)(e) or (f) of the (International 
Arbitration)Act, leave shall be granted only if the applicant undertakes 
to abide by any order the Court or the arbitral tribunal may make as to 
damages. 
[emphasis added] 
D.  2006 Model Law amendments – A broad framework for 
recognition and enforcement 
53  In December 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted changes 
to the 1985 Model Law, which comport with the New Zealand position 
of providing a separate regime for the recognition and enforcement of 
interim measures. The new provisions found in Chapter IVA of the 2006 
Model Law on Interim Measures and Preliminary Orders include a more 
comprehensive regime for dealing with interim measures during the 
course of arbitral proceedings. These provisions provide far more detail 
and guidance than what is currently found in the IAA
102 on the use of 
interim measures. In particular, Art 17A provides a generic definition of 
interim measures and sets out the conditions for granting such 
measures. An important innovation of the revision lies in the 
establishment (in Arts 17H and 17I) of a regime for the recognition and 
enforcement of interim measures, which was modelled on the regime 
for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards under Arts 35 
and 36 of the 1985 Model Law.
103 
54  Unlike s  12(6) of the IAA,
104 Arts  17H and 17I of the 2006 
Model Law include the following specific characteristics: 
(a)  the party seeking recognition or enforcement of the 
interim measure must inform the court if there is any 
termination, suspension or modification of that measure (see 
Art 17H(2)); 
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(b)  the court may order the requesting party to provide 
appropriate security if this has not already been determined by 
the tribunal or where it is necessary to protect the rights of third 
parties (see Art 17H(3)); 
( c )   i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  g r o u n d s  f o r  r e f u s i n g  t o  r e c o g n i s e    
or enforce an interim measure under Art  36(1)(a)(i), 
Art 36(1)(a)(ii),  Art 36(1)(a)(iii)  or  Art 36(1)(a)(iv)  (though 
note that Art  36(1)(v) which only applies in relation to an 
award that is subject to challenge proceedings is excluded) and 
Art  36(1)(b) (arbitrability and public policy), a court may 
refuse to recognise or enforce an interim measure if it finds that 
the interim measure is incompatible with its own powers 
(unless it decides to reformulate the measure to adapt it to its 
powers and procedures) (see Art 17H(1)(b)(i)); and  
(d)  in determining whether to recognise and/or enforce the 
interim measure, the court shall not review the substance of the 
interim measure (see Art 17H(2)). 
55  As mentioned, the UN General Assembly (including Singapore) 
acknowledged in its resolution of 4  December 2006 that the 
amendments relating to interim measures reflected “current practices in 
international trade and modern means of contracting” and would 
“significantly enhance the operation of the Model Law”.
105 Similarly, the 
New Zealand Justice and Electoral Committee recommended to 
Parliament that these amendments be included to increase certainty and 
encourage consistency with international best practice:
106 
Recent changes to the Model Law set out detailed provisions for the 
making of interim measures, including the appropriate test for the 
arbitral tribunal to use regarding the need for interim measures, and 
provision for the making of preliminary orders. We consider that 
including amendments to reflect the recent update to the Model Law 
would increase certainty for arbitral parties by providing more detail as 
to how and when interim measures will be applied. This amendment 
would also ensure that the Act remains consistent with the Model Law, 
and with arbitral legislation in other jurisdictions. [emphasis added] 
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E.  Importance of adopting the Model Law amendments 
56  Some may insist there is no need to amend s 12(6) of the IAA
107 
to bring it in line with recent amendments to the Model Law for the 
sake of certainty and consistency since the possibility of the courts 
enforcing interim measures is recognised by that provision. Yet, arbitral 
jurisprudence indicates that s 12(6) of the IAA has proven controversial 
and would benefit from being updated and augmented by the 2006 
Model Law. 
57  Not all arbitral tribunal-ordered interim measures are 
unremarkable forms of relief that should be enforced by the High Court 
as a matter of course. Suppose an arbitral tribunal imposes an interim 
measure that relates to a matter outside the scope of the tribunal’s 
reference, adversely affects third party rights and/or is contrary to 
Singapore’s public policy. Would the High Court grant leave to enforce 
this measure? The answer should, as a matter of Singapore law, be in the 
negative,
108 yet an International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) arbitral 
tribunal applying Singapore law as the lex arbitri recently opined that it 
could impose interim relief that purports to inquire into the sovereign 
authority of another State to expropriate or exercise police powers in 
relation to its own property, without regard for the High Court’s likely 
approach to matters of Singapore law and public policy:
109 
At the hearing [counsel] eloquently argued that the lex arbitri was the 
law of Singapore, a Singapore judge possess co-extensive jurisdiction 
with the Tribunal to grant interim measures of protection, and that 
therefore this Tribunal should be guided by the principles which 
would be applied by a Singapore court. He also contended that a 
Singapore court would not enforce an order for an interim injunction 
given by this Tribunal if it was against public policy. He said that under 
the Act of State doctrine a Singapore court would not enquire into the 
power or authority of the [defendant] to expropriate or exercise police 
powers in relation to the entry onto or continued possession of [the 
property]. 
This Tribunal is not persuaded that an arbitral tribunal must approach 
an application for interim measures in the same way as would a court 
of the place of arbitration. In any event a broad measure of discretion is 
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conferred on the adjudicating tribunal, be it a court or an arbitral 
tribunal and there is room for latitude. 
[emphasis added] 
58  Absent a codification of the curial support that the arbitral 
t r i b u n a l  c a n  e x p e c t  t o  r e c e i v e  u n d e r  s   1 2 ( 6 )  o f  t h e  I A A ,
110 arbitral 
tribunals can only speculate as to what this ICC panel considered the 
High Court’s “broad measure of discretion” and “latitude” to grant leave 
for enforcement of interim measures permits or prohibits. The ICC 
panel’s decision indicates that it believes the court’s discretion to be, at 
best, amenable or, at worst, immaterial to its own “latitude” regarding 
the grant of interim measures. However, it is well settled that Singapore 
courts do not have “latitude” when it comes to certain matters, 
including those raised in this ICC arbitration. They will not sit in 
judgment of the acts of a foreign sovereign State to expropriate, take 
possession or exercise the right of eminent domain or police powers in 
relation to property in its territory. 
59  As a rule, courts will not adjudicate upon the legality, validity or 
acceptability of sovereign acts of foreign States. The House of Lords in 
Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co described this “act of state” rule 
of public international law, and the principle of comity of nations or 
international comity upon which it is premised, as follows:
111 
There is no doubt as to the general effect of the rule which is known as the 
act of state rule. It applies to the legislative or other governmental acts of 
a recognized foreign state or government within the limits of its own 
territory. The English courts will not adjudicate upon, or call into 
question, any such acts. They may be pleaded and relied upon by way 
of defence in this jurisdiction without being subjected to that kind of 
judicial scrutiny. The rule gives effect to a policy of ‘judicial restraint 
or abstention’: see Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1982] 
AC 888, 931f–934c per Lord Wilberforce. … 
… 
It is clear that very narrow limits must be placed on any exception to the 
act of state rule. As Lord Cross recognized in Oppenheimer v Cattermole 
[1976] AC 249, 277–278, a judge should be slow to refuse to give effect to 
the legislation of a foreign state in any sphere in which, according to 
accepted principles of international law, the foreign state has jurisdiction. 
Among these accepted principles is that which is founded on the comity of 
nations. 
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This principle normally requires our courts to recognize the jurisdiction 
of the foreign state over all assets situated within its own territories: see 
Lord Salmon, at p  282. A  judge should be slow to depart from these 
principles. He may have an inadequate understanding of the 
circumstances in which the legislation was passed. His refusal to 
recognize it may be embarrassing to the executive, whose function is 
so far as possible to maintain friendly relations with foreign states. 
[emphasis added] 
60  International comity is an integral component of Singapore’s 
public policy. Indeed, the rationale for public policy is based on 
“conceptions of international comity”.
112 Adopting the “act of state” 
doctrine, the High Court in Korea Jonmyong Trading Co v Sea-shore 
Transportation Pte Ltd
113 held, quoting the seminal English decision 
Aksionairnoye Obschestvo AM  Luther v James Sagor & Co (“James 
Sagor”):
114 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every 
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in 
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its 
own territory. 
61  James Sagor stands, inter alia, for the proposition that a court 
will recognise:
115 
(a)  the compulsory land acquisition law (pursuant to the 
right of eminent domain) of a foreign State; 
(b)  the change of title of property which has come under 
the control of the foreign State; and 
(c)  the consequences of that change of title. 
62  Section 12(6) of the IAA
116 should be amended to clearly define 
the grounds for and limits on enforcing arbitral interim orders. In 
addition to interim measures that purport to impinge on Singapore 
public policy, there should be other limits on the High Court’s “broad 
discretion” to grant leave for enforcing interim measures. While there is 
no local decision where s 12(6) of the IAA has been invoked to refuse 
enforcement of an arbitral order for interim relief, the Court of Appeal 
has refused to recognise or enforce interim injunctive relief arising out 
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of ongoing domestic arbitrations under the Arbitration Act
117 (“AA”) 
where such relief went beyond the subject-matter of the dispute. 
63  The following cases, and the principles they advance, are useful 
by way of analogy, especially since “the AA and the IAA ought, as far as 
t h e  s t a t u t o r y  l a n g u a g e  a l l o w s ,  t o  b e  r e a d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  b e c a u s e  b o t h  
statutes, taken together, comprise the entire arbitration regime   
available in Singapore”.
118 In Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd v AG
119 
(“Bocotra Construction”), Bocotra was engaged as main contractors for 
the building of an expressway in Singapore. A performance guarantee 
was furnished by Bocotra to secure their performance of the contract. 
Works were delayed. Bocotra claimed damages for delay and additional 
w o r k  c a u s e d  b y  e r r o r s  i n  t e n d e r  d o c u m e n t s  a n d  a l l e g e d  
maladministration by the Singapore Public Works Department 
(“PWD”). PWD counterclaimed for costs of rectification works due 
allegedly to defective works and damages for Bocotra’s delay in 
completion. Bocotra took the view that the counterclaim was a nullity 
and not within the reference before the arbitrator. The claims were 
referred to arbitration. When PWD gave notice that they intended to 
call on the performance guarantee, the arbitrator, on Bocotra’s request, 
issued an interim declaration restraining the PWD from calling on the 
guarantee. Refusing to enforce the interim measure, the Court of Appeal 
held, inter alia, that the disputes relating to the guarantee, being purely 
peripheral to the primary reference to arbitration, did not fall within the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction. 
64  According to the editors of H a l s b u r y ’ s  L a w s  o f  S i n g a p o r e  on 
“Arbitration”,  Bocotra “would perhaps be a good example to justify a 
refusal of leave if the matter was an arbitration under the International 
Arbitration Act”.
120  Bocotra i s  n o t  t h e  o n l y  c a s e  s u p p o r t i n g  t h i s  
proposition. In Dauphin Offshore Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The 
Private Office of HRH Shiekh Sultan bin Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan,
121 
the plaintiffs agreed to build a luxury yacht for the defendant. The 
defendant claimed that the shipyard had breached the construction 
contract in material aspects while the shipyard alleged that the 
defendant had failed to make payments due there under. Again, the 
Court of Appeal refused to restrain a call on a performance bond issued 
in favour of a defendant pending arbitration on the basis that the 
interim relief sought by the plaintiff was premised on issues that were 
collateral to the primary dispute referred to arbitration. 
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65  These Singapore decisions have led one scholar to conclude: 
“Singapore courts take a narrow view of what constitutes the subject 
matter in dispute and have been slow to issue or support grants of 
interim measures where the same falls outside the scope of that subject-
matter” [emphasis added].
122 The IAA
123 should be amended to codify 
this fact – that in exceptional circumstances, the High Court will take a 
“narrow view” rather than give too much “room for latitude” when it 
comes to enforcing interim measures of protection as the ICC panel’s 
decision above in relation to the “act of state rule” seemed to suggest. 
66  Without clearly defined guidelines as to when the High Court 
should grant or deny leave for enforcement, arbitral parties may fear 
uncertainty with respect to the recognition and enforcement of interim 
measures, which does not augur well for the growth and development of 
international commercial arbitration in Singapore. Arbitral parties’ real 
or perceived concerns in this regard may have a chilling effect on the 
choice of Singapore as the place of arbitration and/or Singapore law as 
the lex arbitri because an interim measure cannot be enforced overseas 
under the New York Convention, which strictly pertains to the 
enforcement of foreign awards alone. Arbitral awards, including interim 
awards, are enforceable with the leave of the High Court in the same 
manner as orders or judgments of court. Interlocutory orders and 
d i r e c t i o n s  m a d e  p u r s u a n t  t o  s   1 2 ( 6 )  o f  t h e  I A A
124 in Singapore 
arbitrations are also enforceable in the same manner as if they were 
orders made by the court. Not being in the nature of an arbitral award, 
arbitral orders and directions are limited to enforcement within the 
jurisdiction and are not enforceable under the New York Convention. 
This article would undoubtedly have been enriched by empirical 
research into arbitral parties’ sentiments towards the application of 
s 12(6) of the IAA, but this is in itself not a reason to delay the opening 
of a debate concerning the limitations of this section as it currently 
stands. The time is ripe to adopt the 2006 Model Law amendments and 
improve certainty for arbitral parties by providing more detail as to how 
and when interim measures will be applied. Such adoption would also 
ensure that the IAA remains consistent with the Model Law and with 
arbitral legislation in other jurisdictions. 
F. Recommendation 
67  The 2009 Bill only purports to provide for court-ordered interim 
measures. As such, Parliament has passed up a good opportunity to 
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guide and provide better curial support for arbitral tribunal-ordered 
interim measures, which are the mainstay of s  12 of the IAA.
125 
Section 12 of the IAA does not provide any conditions as to when these 
measures may be ordered, nor does it explain the grounds under which 
the High Court may grant or refuse leave to enforce these measures. The 
recently introduced Arts 17A, 17H and 17I of the 2006 Model Law seek 
to address these gaps by setting out detailed provisions for the making 
of interim measures, including the appropriate test for the arbitral 
tribunal to use regarding the need for interim measures and the grounds 
for recognition and enforcement of these measures. This recent update 
to the Model Law should be incorporated (with minor modifications) 
into Singapore law as it would increase certainty for arbitral parties by 
providing more detail as to how and when interim measures will be 
granted, recognised and enforced. 
68  Consistent with Chapter 4A of the New Zealand Act, which in 
turn modifies and applies Arts 17 A, 17H and 17I of the 2006 Model 
Law, the following amendments should be introduced to the IAA: 
Amendment of s 12 
Section 12 of the principal act is amended by deleting subsection (6). 
New s 12B 
Conditions for granting interim measure 
(1)  If an interim measure of a kind described in subparagraph (a), 
(b), (c), (e), (g), (h), and (i) of the definition of that term in 
section  12(1) is requested, the applicant must satisfy the arbitral 
tribunal that – 
(a)  harm not adequately reparable by an award of 
damages is likely to result if the measure is not granted; and 
(b)  the harm substantially outweighs the harm that is 
likely to result to the respondent if the measure is granted; 
and 
(c)  there is a reasonable possibility that the applicant 
will succeed on the merits of the claim. 
(2)  If an interim measure of a kind described in subparagraph (d) 
and (f) of the definition of that term in Article 12(1) is requested, the 
applicant must satisfy the arbitral tribunal of the matters specified in 
paragraph (1)(a) to (c), but only to the extent that the arbitral tribunal 
considers appropriate. 
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(3)  If an interim measure of a kind described in subparagraph 
(a) of the definition of that term in Article 12(1) is requested, the 
applicant must satisfy the arbitral tribunal that the applicant will be 
able to pay the costs of the respondent if the applicant is unsuccessful 
on the merits of the claim. 
(4)  A determination by the arbitral tribunal on the matter 
specified in paragraph (1)(c) does not affect its discretion to make any 
subsequent determination. 
New s 12C 
Recognition and enforcement 
(1)  An interim measure granted by an arbitral tribunal must be 
recognised as binding and, unless otherwise provided by the arbitral 
tribunal, enforced upon application to the High Court, irrespective of 
the country in which it was granted. 
(2)  Paragraph (1) is subject to section 12D. 
(3)  The applicant for recognition or enforcement of an interim 
measure under Model Law Article 35 must promptly inform the Court 
of any modification, suspension, or cancellation of that interim 
measure. 
(4)  The Court may, if it considers it proper, order the applicant 
to provide appropriate security if – 
(a)  the arbitral tribunal has not already made a decision 
with respect to the provision of security; or 
(b)  the decision with respect to the provision of security 
is necessary to protect the rights of third parties. 
New s 12D 
Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement 
(1)  Recognition or enforcement of an interim measure may be 
refused only – 
(a)  at the request of the respondent if the High Court is 
satisfied that – 
(i)  the refusal is warranted on the grounds set 
out in Article 36(1)(a)(i), (ii), (iii) or (iv); or 
(ii)  the arbitral tribunal’s decision with respect 
to the provision of security in connection with the 
interim measure granted by it has not been 
complied with; or 
(iii)  the interim measure has been suspended or 
cancelled by the arbitral tribunal or, if so 
empowered, by the Court of the country in which 
the arbitration took place or under the law of which 
that interim measure was granted; or 334  Singapore Academy of Law Journal  (2010) 22 SAcLJ 
 
(b)  if the Court finds that – 
(i)  the interim measure is incompatible with 
the powers conferred on the Court, unless the Court 
decides to reformulate the interim measure to the 
extent necessary to adapt it to its own powers and 
procedures for the purposes of enforcing that 
interim measure and without modifying its 
substance; or 
(ii)  any of the grounds set out in 
Article  36(1)(b) apply to the recognition and 
enforcement of the interim measure. 
(2)  A determination made by the Court on any ground in 
paragraph (1) is effective only for the purposes of the application to 
recognise and enforce the interim measure. 
(3)  The Court must not, in making that determination, 
undertake a review of the substance of the interim measure. 
IV.  Conclusion 
69  The 2009 Bill sends a clarion message to the global arbitration 
community that Singapore courts will continue to lend curial assistance 
to arbitration in Singapore and, in more limited circumstances, abroad 
as well. The Bill will undoubtedly fortify Singapore’s reputation as an 
internationally renowned arbitration hub. Nonetheless, the 2009 Bill 
appears to be more of a tune-up than a revision of the IAA designed to 
introduce a broad framework for curial assistance consistent with the 
2006 Model Law. The “inappropriateness” test in s 12A(3) of the 2009 
Bill deserves further legislative clarification. The 2009 Bill also stops 
short of improving the IAA’s existing s 12(6)
126 which relates to arbitral 
tribunal-ordered interim measures, thereby passing up a good 
opportunity to introduce the new provisions of the Model Law which 
seek to address contemporary problems associated with the judicial 
recognition and enforcement of such measures. It is hoped that these 
matters will, as the Ministry promises, be “reconsider[ed] at a later 
juncture and will [be kept] under review”.
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